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PORT STATE JURISDICTION IN NEW 
ZEALAND: THE PROBLEM WITH 
SELLERS 
Bevan Marten* 
This article discusses the decision of the New Zealand Court of Appeal in Sellers v Maritime Safety 
Inspector [1999] 2 NZLR 44. It is not critical of the Court's approach to the use of international law 
in domestic courts, but instead argues that the decision represents an incorrect view of international 
law regarding a port state's jurisdiction over visiting foreign vessels. It argues that the Court was 
wrong to characterise New Zealand's maritime safety agency's use of s 21 of the Maritime 
Transport Act 1994 as an attempt to regulate such vessels on an extraterritorial basis, and that port 
states do possess the jurisdiction to introduce unilateral measures of the kind promoted by the 
agency in that case. The article argues that the decision in Sellers is exercising a negative impact 
over New Zealand's maritime regulatory efforts and that Parliament should address the issue by 
way of amending legislation. 
I INTRODUCTION  
Decided in 1998, Sellers v Maritime Safety Inspector continues to exercise a negative influence 
over New Zealand's maritime law.1 Concerning a yachtsman's refusal to carry a radio, it provided a 
rare example of a domestic court grappling with the extent of a state's prescriptive jurisdiction over 
foreign vessels under international law. The decision has been discussed by several international law 
scholars, the most convincing of whom have argued that the reasoning in the judgment is flawed, 
and that the conclusions reached do not accurately reflect international law.2 However, to date it has 
  
*  Lecturer, Faculty of Law, Victoria University of Wellington. This article draws on material from the 
author's monograph Port State Jurisdiction and the Regulation of International Merchant Shipping 
(Springer, Heidelberg, 2013). 
1  Sellers v Maritime Safety Inspector [1999] 2 NZLR 44 (CA). 
2  See Erik J Molenaar "Port State Jurisdiction: Towards Comprehensive, Mandatory and Global Coverage" 
(2007) 38 Ocean Dev & Intl L 225 at 231–232; Henrik Ringbom The EU Maritime Safety Policy and 
International Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, 2008) at 339; compare Dermott Devine "Port State 
Jurisdiction: A contribution from New Zealand" (2000) 24 Marine Policy 215; Z Oya Özçayir Port State 
Control (2nd ed, LLP, London, 2004) at 90. 
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received little academic attention in New Zealand, despite its ongoing impact on maritime law and 
policy in this jurisdiction.  
This article provides a critique of the decision, focusing on the Court of Appeal's conclusions 
that the legal requirements in question involved extraterritorial elements, and that New Zealand's 
prescriptive jurisdiction as a port state is limited to only those matters contained in international 
agreements. It argues that the influence of Sellers is preventing New Zealand from exercising a full 
range of regulatory options in relation to foreign vessels, and recommends that the decision be 
overturned.  
II THE CONCEPT OF PORT STATE JURISDICTION  
Port state jurisdiction refers to the jurisdiction a state may exercise over foreign vessels visiting 
its ports.3 It can be contrasted with flag state jurisdiction (the jurisdiction a state has over the vessels 
operating under its flag) and coastal state jurisdiction (the jurisdiction a state has over its maritime 
zones such as the territorial sea and exclusive economic zone). Port state jurisdiction warrants 
separate treatment from coastal state jurisdiction more generally for a combination of legal and 
practical factors. As Crawford notes:4 
Quite aside from matters relating to the internal economy of ships, port state jurisdiction is increasingly 
recognized as a remedy for the failure of flag states to exercise effective jurisdiction and control of their 
ships. The jurisdiction is no longer used solely to enforce local questions of civil and criminal law, but is 
actively playing a role in the international regulatory sphere. 
In legal terms the concept is characterised by the subjection of visiting vessels to the state's 
territorial jurisdiction, providing a sound basis for the exercise of both prescriptive and enforcement 
jurisdiction.5 As the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) confirms, a 
  
3  The concept goes well beyond the jurisdiction over pollution events provided for in art 218 of the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1833 UNTS 3 (opened for signature 10 December 1982, entered 
into force 16 November 1994) [UNCLOS], which is headed "port state jurisdiction". Although the label was 
only popularised post-UNCLOS, the notion of a state exercising authority over foreign vessels visiting its 
ports is of course far older. For more detailed overviews of the concept see Ringbom, above n 2; Erik J 
Molenaar "Port State Jurisdiction" in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed) The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law (online ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010). On art 218 see Ted L McDorman 
"Port State Enforcement: A Comment on Article 218 of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention" (1997) 28 J 
Mar L & Comm 305. 
4  James Crawford Brownlie's Principles of Public International Law (8th ed, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2012) at 465. 
5  The legal issues arising in the context of port state jurisdiction are primarily those concerning prescriptive 
jurisdiction. When enforcement is required the vessel is present within the port state's territory and, 
provided the exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction is valid, will be uncontroversial. 
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state's territorial sovereignty extends over both its internal waters (for example harbours and bays)6 
and territorial sea (12 nautical miles out from land).7 Although authors disagree as to the extent of a 
port state's jurisdiction over a visiting foreign vessel, it is universally accepted that such vessels are 
subject to that jurisdiction in general terms, notwithstanding the flag state's concurrent jurisdiction.8  
Port State Jurisdiction is distinguishable from territorial jurisdiction more broadly on the basis of 
the foreign-flagged vessel's right of innocent passage through the territorial sea,9 which Beale 
described as the "chief limitation of a sovereign's jurisdiction over his own territory".10 Where 
vessels passing through the territorial sea in accordance with this right are concerned, art 21 of 
UNCLOS sets out an exhaustive list of the coastal state's regulatory options. It essentially limits 
coastal states to regulating specific aspects of shipping, such as environmental and navigation safety 
issues, and in most cases only in accordance with generally accepted international standards. A state 
could apply its laws to all those vessels passing through the territorial sea whose passage is not 
"innocent", but the situations in which this will occur go well beyond the ordinary operations of 
merchant vessels.11  
By contrast, UNCLOS provides almost no guidance (or limitations) on prescriptive jurisdiction 
exercised over vessels voluntarily visiting a state's ports or internal waters.12 This was a deliberate 
decision at the time the agreement was being negotiated, the result of which is to leave questions of 
port state jurisdiction to be determined in accordance with international law.13 As UNCLOS states 
  
6  The port state jurisdiction concept cannot be equated with "internal waters jurisdiction", as some ports are 
located within the territorial sea. 
7  UNCLOS, above n 3, art 2. Archipelagic waters, where relevant, also fall within this group. 
8  See for examples Myres S McDougal and William T Burke The Public Order of the Oceans: A 
Contemporary International Law of the Sea (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1962) at 94–97 and 156–
157; V D Degan "Internal Waters" (1986) 17 Netherlands YB Intl L 3 at 22; The American Law Institute 
Restatement of the Law Third: The Foreign Relations Law of the United States (American Law Institute 
Publishers, St Paul, 1987) vol 2 at 36 and 42; R R Churchill and A V Lowe The Law of the Sea (3rd ed, 
Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1999) at 65; Crawford, above n 4, at 464. 
9  UNCLOS, above n 3, pt II, s 3; see Crawford, above n 4, at 317. The situations in which passage can be 
described as non-innocent go well beyond the ordinary operations of merchant vessels: see UNCLOS, above 
n 3, art 19.  
10  Joseph H Beale "The Jurisdiction of a Sovereign State" (1923) 36 Harv LR 241 at 259. 
11  See UNCLOS, above n 3, art 19. 
12  Some limited references to port entry conditions are made, see UNCLOS, above n 3, arts 25(2) and 211(3). 
13  Erik J Molenaar Coastal State Jurisdiction over Vessel-Source Pollution (Kluwer Law International, The 
Hague, 1998) at 94; David Anderson "Port States and Environmental Protection" in Alan Boyle and David 
Freestone (eds) International Law and Sustainable Development: Past Achievements and Future Challenges 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999) at 342; Churchill and Lowe, above n 8, at 60–61; Lindy S Johnson 
Coastal State Regulation of International Shipping (Oceana Publications Inc, Dobbs Ferry, 2004) at 35 and 
46. 
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in its preamble, any "matters not regulated by this Convention continue to be governed by the rules 
and principles of general international law". Putting aside the limitations on prescriptive jurisdiction 
relating to vessels enjoying sovereign immunity,14 or those in distress,15 international law discloses 
no shipping-specific16 limits on the extent of port state jurisdiction.17 As a result it is a very 
effective basis for the regulation of foreign vessels when compared with coastal state jurisdiction 
more generally. 
In practical terms port state jurisdiction is characterised by having the vessels a state intends to 
regulate in a convenient location for the purposes of inspection and enforcement. This is of course 
far safer and more efficient than attempting enforcement at sea. Accordingly, while it is legally 
possible to extend a law to all ships within a state's internal waters and territorial sea, the 
combination of innocent passage and difficult enforcement means that in practice states often prefer 
to apply certain laws only to vessels that actually visit a port. 
This is reflected in the port state control context, with which the term "port state" is most 
commonly associated. Port state control is a narrower concept than port state jurisdiction, involving 
the inspection and assessment of visiting vessels against a range of internationally-agreed standards 
on matters such as safety and environmental safeguards.18 These inspections are generally arranged 
on a regional basis, so that information can be shared and efforts targeted towards the most high-risk 
ships.19 Port state control is usually provided for in international shipping agreements,20 but the 
  
14  UNCLOS, above n 3, arts 29–32 and 95–96. 
15  See generally Aldo Chircop and Olof Linden (eds) Places of Refuge for Ships: Emerging Environmental 
Concerns of a Maritime Custom (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, 2006). 
16  More general limitations on prescriptive jurisdiction continue to apply, such as the principle of good faith 
and the doctrine of abuse of rights: UNCLOS, above n 3, art 300. In addition the principle of proportionality 
and prohibitions on discrimination against particular flags will impact on the exercise of port state 
jurisdiction: see Ringbom, above n 2, at 223–230. 
17  In the past some authors have argued that under customary international law a port state has no jurisdiction 
over a vessel's "internal affairs", but this has been convincingly dismissed: see for example A H Charteris 
"The Legal Position of Merchantmen in Foreign Ports and National Waters" (1920–1921) 1 Brit YB Intl L 
45 at 46; Philip C Jessup The Law of Territorial Waters and Maritime Jurisdiction (G A Jennings Co, New 
York, 1927) at 191–194; McDougal and Burke, above n 8, at 164–165. The concept may still have some 
relevance as a rule of domestic law in some jurisdictions: see for example Spector v Norwegian Cruise Line 
Ltd 545 US 119 (2005). 
18  See generally Özçayir, above n 2. 
19  The first agreement was the Paris MOU, on which other regional memoranda are based: Paris Memorandum 
of Understanding on Port State Control (adopted 26 January 1982, entered into force 1 July 1982). The 
relevant instrument in the New Zealand context is the Tokyo MOU: Memorandum of Understanding on Port 
State Control in the Asia-Pacific Region (adopted 1 December 1993, entered into force 1 April 1994). 
20  See for example International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) 1184 UNTS 278 (opened 
for signature 1 November 1974, entered into force 25 May 1980) at reg I-19; International Convention on 
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same effect can be achieved by relying on port state jurisdiction more generally. In other words, 
such provisions merely confirm the existence of port state jurisdiction in a particular context; they 
do not create it. This is demonstrated by the common practice of taking port state control measures 
against vessels operating under the flags of states that are not party to the conventions in question.21  
While port state control arrangements provide the most visible example of port state jurisdiction 
being exercised in practice, the most challenging issues arise when states use port state jurisdiction 
to introduce unilateral shipping regulations. As noted above, UNCLOS and customary international 
law place few restrictions on the use of port state jurisdiction. Therefore, putting aside the rare 
examples of international conventions that explicitly limit port state jurisdiction, 22  the most 
important checks on such unilateral measures are economic and political.23 If a port state goes too 
far beyond the international norm, for example by introducing a law requiring all visiting foreign 
vessels to carry an expensive wind generation system for use in port, then ship operators may decide 
to trade elsewhere. Furthermore, the port state in question may receive sharp criticisms from other 
states that view a multilateral approach under the auspices of the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) as a more appropriate avenue for reform.  
These considerations carry particular weight in the shipping sector, which on the whole benefits 
from uniform regulations developed at the international level in order to promote the smooth 
functioning of international trade.24 However, the IMO does not have a monopoly on shipping 
regulation and has been "hurried along" by port states in the past.25 Unless they expressly limit a 
  
the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 1973 1340 UNTS 184 as modified by the Protocol of 1978 relating 
thereto (opened for signature 2 November 1973 and 17 February 1978 respectively, entered into force 2 
October 1983) [MARPOL] at annex I, reg 2–11. 
21  A number of agreements have "no more favourable treatment" clauses which support this practice, see for 
example MARPOL, above n 20, art 5(4); International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification 
and Watchkeeping for Seafarers 1361 UNTS 2 (STCW) (opened for signature 7 July 1978, entered into 
force 28 April 1984), art X(5). See Molenaar, above n 13, at 119–121. 
22  See for example MARPOL, above n 20, at annex VI, reg 15(1). 
23  For related discussion see for example David Allan Fitch "Unilateral Action Versus Universal Evolution of 
Safety and Environmental Protection Standards in Maritime Shipping of Hazardous Cargoes" (1979) 20 
Harv Intl LJ 127 at 167–173; Alan Khee Jin Tan "The Regulation of Vessel-Source Marine Pollution: 
Reconciling the Maritime and Coastal State Interests" (1997) 1 Sing J Intl & Comp L 355 at 375–376; Alan 
Boyle "EU Unilateralism and the Law of the Sea" (2006) 21 Intl J Mar & Coast L 15 at 20 and 31. 
24  The importance of promoting international approaches in the maritime sector has long been recognised: see 
Richard A Legatski, "Port State Jurisdiction over Vessel-Source Marine Pollution" (1977) 2 Harv Env LR 
448 at 467; Fitch, above n 23, at 144–145; J Peter A Bernhardt "A Schematic Analysis of Vessel-Source 
Pollution: Prescriptive and Enforcement Regimes in the Law of the Sea Conference" (1979) 20 Virg J Intl L 
265 at 268. 
25  For example, unilateral action by the European Union in relation to the phasing-out of double-hulled tankers 
ultimately compelled the IMO to update the international timetable: see Ringbom, above n 2, at 235 and 
346–352. 
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port state's jurisdiction, the IMO's agreements represent minimum international standards, and a 
state is free to introduce more stringent standards if it sees fit.26 This is further demonstrated by the 
savings provision included in each port state control memorandum to the effect that it does not limit 
a party's port state jurisdiction. 27  Provided the state can justify the measure on political and 
economic grounds then a measure based on port state jurisdiction will often provide a sound means 
of unilaterally regulating international merchant shipping.  
While examples of such measures remain uncommon, instances of state practice are coming to 
light more rapidly than in previous decades, particularly as a result of legislation introduced by the 
European Union and United States.28 New Zealand is not a significant port state in terms of vessel 
movements but its relative isolation, sensitive marine environment, and extensive maritime zones do 
place the country in a position whereby some unilateral requirements could be justified on policy 
grounds. A good example is the one provided in Sellers, namely the regulation of safety equipment 
aboard pleasure craft29 that are passing through New Zealand's expansive zone of responsibility for 
search and rescue.30  However, the decision in Sellers has hampered the deployment by New 
Zealand of any regulations not based on an international agreement.  
III THE DECISION IN SELLERS 
The appellant in Sellers was the master of the Nimbus, a Maltese-registered private yacht. He 
was not granted clearance to leave port by the New Zealand authorities on the basis that he was not 
carrying a radio or emergency locator beacon in accordance with s 21 of the Maritime Transport Act 
1994 (the MTA). This requires the master of a pleasure vessel departing for overseas to satisfy the 
maritime safety authorities that the vessel is adequately crewed, complies with any relevant 
Maritime Rules,31 and that "the pleasure craft and its safety equipment are adequate for the voyage". 
  
26  Erik J Molenaar "Residual Jurisdiction under IMO Regulatory Conventions" in Henrik Ringbom (ed) 
Competing Norms in the Law of Marine Environmental Protection: Focus on Ship Safety and Pollution 
Prevention (Kluwer Law International, London, 1997); Johnson, above n 13, at 43–44; Ringbom, above n 2, 
at 222–223.This is reflected in more recent IMO agreements, see for example International Convention on 
the Control of Harmful Anti-fouling Systems on Ships 1833 UNTS 397 (opened for signature 5 October 
2001, entered into force 17 September 2008), art 1(3); International Convention for the Control and 
Management of Ships' Ballast Water and Sediments (opened for signature 13 February 2004, not yet in 
force), art 2(3). 
27  See for example Paris MOU, above n 19, ss 1.7 and 8.1; Tokyo MOU, above n 19, ss 3.2.2 and 8.1. 
28  See Bevan Marten Port State Jurisdiction and the Regulation of International Merchant Shipping (Springer, 
Berlin, 2013) at ch 7. 
29  No legal distinction is made in this article between pleasure craft and other private (for example merchant) 
vessels.  
30  See Sellers v Maritime Safety Inspector, above n 1, at 48–49. 
31  These are detailed technical regulations covering a wide range of shipping matters, primarily drawn from 
standards agreed at the international level. For a full list see <www.maritimenz.govt.nz>. 
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Mr Sellers, who was deliberately not carrying the equipment in question on the basis of his personal 
philosophy of navigation, was prosecuted and convicted in the District Court for a breach of the 
MTA. He appealed, first to the High Court and then to the Court of Appeal, on the basis of the 
principle of the freedom of the high seas. From Mr Sellers' perspective, being compelled to carry a 
radio by the New Zealand authorities was inconsistent with his right to navigate his vessel as he 
pleased. 
The Court of Appeal's decision was given by Keith J, now a Judge of the International Court of 
Justice. The Court based its decision upon the principle of the exclusive jurisdiction of the flag state 
over its vessels on the high seas,32 as guaranteed by UNCLOS.33 It held that the effect of the 
Maritime Safety Authority's approach to s 21 of the MTA was to interfere with this jurisdiction by 
requiring safety equipment to be carried beyond New Zealand's internal waters.34 The Court did not 
state that it was never possible for a state to regulate the extraterritorial operations of a foreign-
flagged vessel, but that this was only possible in a very limited number of situations, as for example 
when acting to prevent an imminent oil spill.35 Extraterritorial jurisdiction based on the effects 
doctrine was also discussed, and its application ruled out in the context of s 21 as no relevant effects 
were felt in New Zealand's territory.36 
The jurisdiction of port states was discussed, but only in relation to their role in enforcing 
internationally-agreed standards, notably through port state control arrangements. 37  The Court 
rightly identified that international agreements such as the International Convention for the Safety of 
Life at Sea (SOLAS) and the International Convention on the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 
(MARPOL) place primary responsibility for compliance with the flag state, leaving port states to 
play a supporting role in enforcement. However, their Honours then used this to support a 
conclusion that a port state only has prescriptive jurisdiction to the extent provided for under such 
agreements. To support this the Court concluded that art 21 of UNCLOS, which limits a coastal 
state's jurisdiction over foreign vessels exercising innocent passage in its territorial sea, 
demonstrates that a port state has no ability to create its own, unilateral safety obligations.38 In other 
words, if a port state cannot point to UNCLOS or another international agreement, or a widely-
  
32  Sellers v Maritime Safety Inspector, above n 1, at 46–47. 
33  UNCLOS, above n 3, art 92 
34  Sellers v Maritime Safety Inspector, above n 1, at 48. 
35  At 47–48. 
36  At 49–51. 
37  At 51–54. 
38  At 54. 
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accepted basis of extraterritorial jurisdiction such as the effects doctrine, it has no ability to regulate 
the vessels visiting its ports. The Court concluded that:39 
[A] port state has no general power to unilaterally impose its own requirements on foreign ships relating 
to their construction, their safety and other equipment and their crewing if the requirements are to have 
effect on the high seas. Any requirements cannot go beyond those generally accepted, especially in the 
maritime conventions and regulations; … In addition, any such port state powers relate only to those 
foreign ships which are in a hazardous state. 
Accordingly the Court's view was that the requirements imposed by the maritime safety 
authorities under s 21 of the MTA had to be in accordance with international law, and thus limited 
to requirements provided for under internationally agreed rules and standards.40 Mr Sellers' appeal 
succeeded and his conviction was quashed. 
IV EVERYTHING HAPPENED IN PORT 
The Sellers decision was not incorrect in emphasising the flag state's exclusive jurisdiction over 
a vessel on the high seas. However, that is not the effect, in legal terms, of a provision like s 21 of 
the MTA. As the Court noted:41 
That provision can be seen as doing no more than creating an offence which is committed within New 
Zealand internal waters, at the point of departure from port, and which can be enforced only by 
proceedings brought in a New Zealand court, without any related powers being exercisable on the high 
seas. On that basis, neither the exercise of legislative jurisdiction nor the exercise of judicial jurisdiction 
over the alleged breaches of it relates to events outside New Zealand or even outside New Zealand 
internal waters. 
This was the right answer. The requirement to carry a radio and locator beacon was applied by 
way of port state jurisdiction. The vessel was within New Zealand's territory, and subject to New 
Zealand laws. 
However, the Court in Sellers declined to adopt this position on the basis that the real effect of 
the provision was to qualify the exercise of the freedom to navigate on the high seas, in the instant 
case because New Zealand's maritime authorities wanted the vessel's radio and locator beacon to be 
aboard once the vessel left port.42 This was certainly true, but it was not the approach taken in legal 
terms. The Court's concern for the impact of domestic standards on vessels on the high seas is 
  
39  At 57. 
40  At 59–62. 
41  At 48. 
42  Davidson reluctantly concludes that this was the right approach: J Scott Davidson "Freedom of Navigation 
on the High Seas: Sellers v Maritime Safety Inspector" (1999) 14 Intl J Mar & Coast L 435 at 438–439. 
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understandable. However, international law does not prevent a state from declaring that if a vessel 
wants to visit (or depart from) its ports, it must be carrying specific equipment. The master in Sellers 
could have jettisoned his newly-purchased radio as soon as he was outside of New Zealand's 
territorial sea, but he ought to have been compelled to comply with the prescribed safety standards 
while within New Zealand's jurisdiction. 
Section 21 of the MTA reflects a common approach in the context of port state jurisdiction. A 
requirement is introduced that is static in nature, such as the need to carry a radio. The presence or 
absence of a radio is unlikely to change; it is either aboard or it is not upon entry to port. Such laws 
can be seen as a form of continuing offence. The vessel will be progressing through its international 
voyage in an ongoing breach of the requirement. However, instead of trying to determine when the 
problem first arose, the port state simply assesses compliance with the requirement while the vessel 
is in port, and declares the breach to have occurred at that point in time. Although the expectation is 
that the vessel will comply with the requirement, and then continue in a state of compliance once it 
leaves port, in legal terms the port state is concerned only with what takes place within its 
jurisdiction.  
The approach is particularly effective where the requirement is fundamental to the vessel that it 
could never be removed in practice, such as the need to have a double hull. An influential port state 
can thus introduce a unilateral standard that in practical terms is enormously significant to a 
shipping operation. This reinforces the importance of the economic and political limitations on the 
introduction of unilateral standards, referred to above, as a means of keeping most shipping 
regulation within the multilateral programme of the IMO. 
As the foregoing suggests, port state jurisdiction works best when it concerns only matters that 
can be assessed as having been breached within the port state's territory. Far more controversial 
issues arise when a port state attempts to regulate the operations of foreign vessels taking place 
beyond the territorial sea. As this was not the case in Sellers (at least in my view) these issues are 
not the focus of this article. Nonetheless, it is important to note that port states do occasionally 
attempt to regulate, even if indirectly, the extraterritorial operations of foreign vessels in a manner 
that goes beyond the limits described by the Court of Appeal.43 When this occurs, the port state in 
question will not argue that they are attempting to dictate the extraterritorial operations of foreign 
vessels. They will further accept that the flag state has exclusive jurisdiction on the high seas and 
that their coastal state jurisdiction is limited by UNCLOS. Instead they will argue that, as there is no 
right of access to a state's ports under international law,44 they are simply introducing conditions of 
port entry that the vessel's operator has chosen to accept. If a vessel has not operated in accordance 
  
43  See Marten, above n 28, at ch 4. 
44  A V Lowe "The Right of Entry into Maritime Ports in International Law" (1977) 14 San Diego LR 597. 
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with those conditions en route, then it will either be denied permission to enter port, or subject to 
sanctions on arrival.45  
The facts of Sellers disclosed a situation in which it would have been more appropriate for a 
court to look to the formal jurisdictional basis of the requirement as opposed to its intended effects. 
The port state has the necessary (territorial) jurisdiction, the foreign vessel has voluntarily submitted 
to its rules, and remains free to operate as it pleases following departure. Port state control measures 
around the world rely on this approach daily to ensure that vessels remain up to standard. This 
process, on which the maritime world depends so heavily, could not work in relation to the vessels 
of non-parties if the Sellers approach was taken. 
V PORT STATES' POWERS ARE BROADER 
The more significant problem with the Sellers decision concerns the extent of a port state's 
jurisdiction. Instead of taking a state's largely unfettered territorial jurisdiction over visiting foreign 
vessels as its starting point, the Court looked to various international maritime agreements, and held 
those up as representing the extent of a port state's prescriptive jurisdiction.  
The correct position is that port state jurisdiction is not comprehensively dealt with in any 
international convention. The subject of a state's authority over vessels visiting its ports was 
deliberately left out of UNCLOS, and the concept continues to be governed mainly by customary 
international law.46 Conventions such as SOLAS and MARPOL provide an enforcement function 
for port states but, as noted above, this does not limit their ability to prescribe and enforce more 
stringent standards than those agreed to. While the aim of such conventions may be to harmonise 
international maritime law, this is not sufficient to limit the prescriptive jurisdiction of port states 
without explicit words to this effect.47 Only in rare cases will a provision of an international 
convention expressly limit port state jurisdiction, as in the case of MARPOL setting a maximum 
limit on vessel emissions.48 By contrast, parties to the 1923 convention on ports mentioned in the 
Court of Appeal's judgment grant non-discriminatory port access to other parties' vessels. The 
agreement contains no provisions limiting the scope of any requirements the port state may decide 
to apply to the vessels granted such access.49 
  
45  For further discussion see Molenaar, above n 2; Henrik Ringbom "Global Problem – Regional Solution? 
International Law Reflections on an EU CO2 Emissions Trading Scheme for Ships" (2011) 26 Intl J Mar & 
Coast L 613.  
46 See Molenaar, above n 13, at 94; Anderson, above n 13, at 342; Churchill and Lowe, above n 8, 60-61; 
Johnson, above n 13, 35 and 46. 
47 Ringbom, above n 2, at 219–223; Johnson, above n 14, at 43–44; Boyle, above n 23, s24–25. 
48 See for example MARPOL, above n 20, at annex VI, reg 15(1). 
49  Sellers v Maritime Safety Inspector, above n 1, at 49; Convention and Statute on the International Regime of 
Maritime Ports 58 LNTS 285 (opened for signature 9 December 1923, entered into force 26 July 1926)).  
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Molenaar's criticism of the decision is summarised as follows:50 
The Court appears to have: misinterpreted Article 211(3) of the LOS Convention, failed to discuss the 
absence of a right of access to ports under general international law and Article 25(2) of the LOS 
Convention, incorrectly linking the notion of "generally accepted" to port state jurisdiction, 
misinterpreted the function of regional merchant shipping PSC regimes, and failed to refer to the savings 
clauses therein. 
As Ringbom notes, following the Court's logic would mean that the majority of the world's port 
states are acting unlawfully in applying their domestic shipping standards.51 
VI OVERTURNING SELLERS 
As demonstrated by the discussion above, I believe that the interpretation of the international 
law relating to port state jurisdiction provided by Sellers is incorrect. However, the decision also has 
an ongoing negative impact in the domestic law context, effectively hamstringing any attempt to 
regulate foreign shipping on a unilateral basis. Although New Zealand is unlikely to have the desire 
(or the international clout) to introduce too many laws of this kind, where they are justified on sound 
policy grounds the option should be available. 
As Sellers demonstrates, maritime legislation in New Zealand must be interpreted in light of 
international law.52 If the maritime industry were able to be regulated by nothing but unambiguous 
statutory sections, then this exercise might not have much impact on any expressly unilateral 
exercises of port state jurisdiction. However, the complex nature of the shipping sector requires a 
range of broadly-worded provisions, secondary legislation (notably the Maritime Rules),53 and 
discretionary powers to account for all foreseeable circumstances. Since 1998, these provisions and 
powers have had to be read down to meet the Sellers interpretation of New Zealand's port state 
  
50  Molenaar, above n 2, at 232 (references omitted); see also Erik J Molenaar, Alex G Oude Elferink and 
Denise Prevost Study on the Labour Market and Employment Conditions in Intra-Community Regular 
Maritime Transport Services Carried Out by Ships under Member States' or Third Countries' Flags: 
Aspects of International Law (Netherlands Institute for the Law of the Sea, University of Utrecht, Utrecht, 
2008) at 38–39. 
51 Ringbom, above n 2, at 339. 
52  Sellers v Maritime Safety Inspector, above n 1, at 57–62. The decision formed part of a wider movement, 
spearheaded by Keith J, towards the greater acceptance of international law's place within New Zealand's 
domestic law: see Claudia Geiringer "Tavita and All That: Confronting the Confusion Surrounding 
Unincorporated Treaties and Administrative Law" (2004) 21 NZULR 66, especially 76–77 and 79–80 and 
104–105; John McGrath "Commentary: International Law's Recent Influence on Domestic Court Decisions 
in New Zealand" in Claudia Geiringer and Dean R Knight (eds) Seeing the World Whole: Essays in Honour 
of Sir Kenneth Keith (Victoria University Press, Wellington, 2008) 136 at 142–144. 
53  These are sourced primarily from international conventions like SOLAS and MARPOL but including 
domestic requirements, take up a lot of space on the surveyor's shelf. They are technical, detailed, and ever-
evolving. 
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jurisdiction. For example, the need for foreign pleasure vessels to carry a radio and locator beacon, 
formerly made compulsory under s 21 of the MTA, is now merely a non-binding recommendation. 
The Sellers interpretation will also have an ongoing effect on new legislation.54 Recently the 
Government has introduced a Bill that, from 2016, will see all fishing vessels in New Zealand's 
maritime zones operate under the New Zealand flag.55 As an interim measure foreign flagged 
vessels will continue to be licensed to operate, but the Minister may consider:56  
any risk associated with fisheries management, employment, vessel safety, or compliance with maritime 
rules relating to pollution and the discharge of waste material from vessels that the chief executive 
considers would be likely to result if the vessel were to be registered.  
Reading this requirement in light of Sellers it could be argued that the considerations listed must 
relate only to standards based on international agreements. If the chief executive anticipated a risk 
relating to safety equipment that was not present aboard a foreign vessel, its operator could respond 
that New Zealand has no jurisdiction to prescribe such a requirement, and cannot therefore introduce 
one through the "back door" in this way. Given that the fishing industry is subject to very few 
safety-related rules agreed to at the international level,57 this has the potential to hamper New 
Zealand's intentions of promoting high standards in the sector. 
In terms of overturning Sellers, one option would be to take an analogous case through the 
appellate courts in the hope of a different result. This is feasible, but subject to the uncertainties of 
litigation. A better approach would be to draw the decision's sting by way of a legislative 
amendment. This would best be achieved by including a provision in the MTA that reasserts New 
Zealand's port state jurisdiction and ability to regulate foreign vessels in a unilateral manner if 
desired. The provision should make clear that rules affecting foreign shipping can be made in 
situations where no equivalent international standards exist. It should also include wording to the 
effect that regulators may introduce provisions that are more stringent than any relevant 
international standards when framing Maritime Rules and other secondary legislation, provided 
certain criteria are met. For example, that the intention to introduce more stringent standards is 
expressly stated in the rules, and that the standards are as consistent as practicable with the objects 
and purpose of the relevant international standard. 
  
54  See for example New Zealand Steel Mining Ltd "Submission of New Zealand Steel Mining Ltd to the 
Transport and Industrial Relations Committee on the Marine Legislation Bill" (12 October 2012) at [13.5] 
and [40], relying on the Sellers decision to oppose a change to the law relating to the loading of ships. 
55  Fisheries (Foreign Charter Vessels and Other Matters) Amendment Bill (75–2). 
56  At cl 4. 
57  The Chief Executive could attempt to rely on the fishing licence conditions that may be imposed under 
UNCLOS to provide the necessary jurisdictional basis, but even this approach could arguably be read down 
if Sellers-style reasoning is followed: UNCLOS, above n 3, art 64. 
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I proposed an amendment to this effect at the Select Committee stage of the Marine Legislation 
Bill.58 However, the advice of the Ministry was that this was too complex a matter to be dealt with 
in the context of the Bill,59 and the suggestion was not taken up by the Committee in its report. An 
opportunity for reform will no doubt arise in time. After all, it should take only one legislative 
amendment with a background critical of Sellers to convince a court that it can overlook the port 
state jurisdiction aspects of the decision: New Zealand's Parliament would have in effect rejected the 
Court's interpretation of international law on that point. In the meantime New Zealand's maritime 
law remains tangled in the rigging of the Nimbus. 
  
  
58  Bevan Marten "Submission on the Maritime Legislation Bill" (8 October 2012) 1–4. 
59  Ministry of Transport and Ministry for the Environment "Marine Legislation Bill 2012: Report of the 
Ministry of Transport and the Ministry for the Environment" (15 November 2012) at 66. 
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